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State Enterprise Center of Registers 
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State Data Protection Inspectorate 
Interested third parties 
Population Register Service under the 
Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior 
Information Society Development Committee 
under the Ministry of Transport 
Communications Regulatory Authority 
Private Company Digital Certification Centre 
DECISION 
of the 
HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF LITHUANIA 
of 18 December 2012 
Vilnius 
 
Lithuanian Higher Administrative Court composed of 
judges Laima Baltrūnaitė (Chairman), Anatolijus 
Baranovas (Rapporteur) and Irmantas Jarukaitis, 
secretary Lilija Andrijauskaitė, 
in the presence of applicant’s representative Jurgita 
Apanskiene, 
defendant’s representative Simona Gavorskaitė, 
the interested third party, Lithuanian Communications 
Regulatory Authority, representative Marina 
Lavrinavičiūtė, 
the interested third party, Private Company Digital 
Certification Centre, representative Mudrik Dadašov, 
in the administrative proceedings started by the 
applicant, State Enterprise Centre of Registers, against 
the defendant State Data Protection Inspectorate, the 
interested third parties, the Lithuanian 
Communications Regulatory Authority, the 
Information Society Development Committee under 
the Ministry of Communications, Office of the Register 
of Population of the Republic of Lithuania under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Private Company Digital 
Certification Centre for the annulment of the 
defendant’s Order, 
whereas the appeal proceedings have been started by 
the defendant, the State Data Protection 
Inspectorate, seeking to have set aside the decision of 
Vilnius District Administrative Court of 11 April 2012 
(‘the contested decision’), 
decides as follows, 
Decision 
Background to the dispute 
I. 
The applicant, the State Enterprise Centre of Registers 
(‘the applicant’) brought a complaint to the Vilnius 
District Administrative Court (Court of first instance) 
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for annulment of the order ‘On the processing of 
personal data’ No. 2R-3659 (2.13) dated 14 November 
2011 (‘Order’) issued by the defendant, the State Data 
Protection Inspectorate (‘the defendant’ or ‘the 
appellant’). 
The applicant requested an annulment of the Order 
since it does not meet the statutory requirements and 
therefore is not justified. The applicant noted that the 
State Enterprise Center of Registers, in accordance 
with its legal nature and the functions, is a public 
administration body. The issuance of qualified 
certificates should be regarded as a public 
administration activity, because, according to Law on 
Electronic Signature, the main purpose of issuing such 
certificates is to create qualified electronic signatures, 
proving a person’s identity in cyberspace. The 
principles of issuing qualified certificates have been 
set out in the Resolution of the Government of 
Lithuania No. 2108 of 31 December 2002 on the 
requirements to service providers issuing qualified 
certificates, and the requirements for devices of 
electronic signature and the registration of such 
service providers and the electronic signature 
supervision scheme (‘Resolution No. 2108’). According 
to the Clause 5 of the Resolution No. 2108, service 
providers must validate their Certificate Practice 
Statements (‘CPS’) and publish them on-line. 
According to Resolution No. 2108, the supervision of 
service providers issuing qualified certificates has 
been conducted by the Information Society 
Development Committee under the Ministry of 
Transport (‘Committee’) until 19th of January 2011, 
and from 20th of January 2011 this supervision is 
performed by the Lithuanian Communications 
Regulatory Authority (‘Communications Authority’). 
The CPS (the first edition) of the applicant was 
published on its web site in September 2008, after it 
had been approved by the supervisory body – the 
Committee. Therefore Order No. V-226 adopted by 
the State Enterprise Centre of Registers on 24 
November 2010 has to be considered as a normative 
administrative act, the provision of which (putting a 
personal code into the qualified certificate) must not 
be recognized as contradicting the provisions of the 
Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data or any other 
requirements/orders of the abovementioned state 
administration institutions. 
In addition, as has been ruled in the judgment of the 
Higher Administrative Court of Lithuania on 29 August 
2011, in case No 575-392/2011, the abovementioned 
administrative act has only validated other acts 
(Certificate Policy and Certificate Practice Statement). 
This means that the act has enforced the functions of 
the applicant regarding the Law on Electronic 
Signature. 
While establishing the content, structure and 
procedures of qualified certificates, the State 
Enterprise Centre of Registers followed the rules of 
the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data that 
were valid on 12 February 2003 (in force on 1 July 
2003). According to article 7(3) of the mentioned law, 
the personal identification number can be used in the 
public records and information systems without the 
consent of the data subject, if allowed by legal acts. 
However, despite the abovementioned provisions of 
the law that permits the State Enterprise Centre of 
Registers, as a qualified certificate provider, to use the 
personal identification number without the data 
subject’s consent, the State Enterprise Centre of 
Registers in all cases informed and signed the 
contracts with its customers regarding the use of 
personal identification numbers in qualified 
certificates. 
When creating qualified certificates, it is necessary to 
follow the provisions of the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data and provisions of other mandatory 
legislative acts. Pursuant to article 2(5) of the Law on 
Electronic Signature the safe electronic signature is 
defined as the one that meets all the requirements 
specified: 1) it is uniquely linked to the signatory; 2) 
allows the identification of the signatory; 3) is created 
by tools that the signatory can control by his request; 
4) is connected with the personal data in a way that 
all the changes are detectable. In addition, pursuant 
to article 2(15) of the Law on Electronic Signature, 
specific attributes can be inserted in the qualified 
certificate if such information is necessary. The 
applicant emphasized that according to the current 
legislation there is no other special attribute, other 
than personal identification number, that would allow 
the individual to be unambiguously identified. 
Qualified certificates can be used to obtain access to 
the on-line services of the public institutions, 
therefore the personal identification number, being 
the unique identifier, is mandatory in qualified 
certificates. 
Lithuanian legislation provides that a person can be 
identified by name, address and personal 
identification number, however a person cannot be 
identified simply by name and surname, as there can 
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be several individuals with same names and 
surnames. Therefore, the personal identification 
number is the only data item that is not misleading, 
and when used in a qualified certificate, in its essence 
has to be considered equal to an ID or passport. 
Among other things, the applicant pointed out that 
article 7 of the current Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data does not prohibit the use of a personal 
code in the State registries and information systems if 
they are allowed by legal acts. The law explicitly 
prohibits making the personal identification number 
publicly available, and prevents the collection and use 
of the personal identification number for direct 
marketing purposes. The applicant argues that issue 
of qualified certificates for signing e-documents and e-
mails does not make these certificates, nor the 
personal identification numbers public. The certificate 
holder chooses for which purpose he/she wants to 
use the qualified certificate. 
Defendant asked to dismiss the complaint as 
unfounded. 
The defendant stated that according to the applicant’s 
procedures, the use of the personal identification 
number in the qualified certificates should not be 
regarded as the use of a personal identification 
number in State registries and information systems, 
when such data is made available to the receiver of 
the electronically signed document. 
The use of a personal code for signing e-documents 
and e-mails cannot be considered as conforming with 
the criteria of lawful processing of personal 
identification number as set out in article 7(2) of Law 
on Legal Protection of Personal Data. The law 
establishes the necessary requirement of obtaining 
the data subject’s consent. The data subject should be 
able to choose whether or not to use the personal 
code for signing e-documents and e-mails. The refusal 
to use the personal identification number would 
result in an inability to use the applicant’s service – to 
sign with an electronic signature. On the other hand, 
the person who received a signed e-document or e-
mail cannot use the personal identification number in 
the certificate to verify the identity of the signatory, 
because the recipient has no prior knowledge of the 
personal code of the signatory. Furthermore, no 
personal identification number is required when 
signing the paper documents. 
Since the validity of the electronic signature is 
determined after the status of the certificate is 
primarily confirmed by the certification service 
provider, there is no need to use the personal 
identification number to verify the identity of the 
signatory. The defendant pointed out that according 
to the Order, the use of a personal code for signing e-
documents and e-mails is excessive management of 
personal data (personal identification number). By 
issuing a certificate with a personal identification 
number, the applicant breaches the article 3(1), point 
4 of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data. The 
use of a personal identification number in the 
electronic signature creates a possibility for 
uncontrolled distribution of the signatory’s personal 
identification number. 
The rapid increase of use of electronic signatures 
means that the personal identification number may 
be disclosed to an unlimited number of third parties 
and used without control. The personal identification 
number would be disclosed to the receiver of signed 
e-document or e-mail, it also could be stored in the 
recipient’s computer. Moreover, the holder of e-
signature would be obliged to disclose his/her 
personal code when signing other e-documents (e.g., 
on the Internet), petitions or similar instruments. 
According to the article 3(3) of the Law on Electronic 
Signature, the verification of the signature is public, 
whereas article 7(4) of the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data prohibits making the personal code 
public. In addition, according to article 8(3) and article 
4(9) of Law on residents’ register, the personal 
identification number is a unique and unalterable 
identifier used for collecting individual data. If the 
personal identification number is widely available, the 
increase of the possibility of unauthorized access in 
the state registers and information systems might 
cause the violation of a person’s privacy. There is a 
risk that the personal identification number might be 
made available and used without a legitimate 
purpose. It would lead to violation of articles 3 and 7 
of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data. 
Furthermore, article 8(1) of the Directive 1999/93/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 1999 on a Community framework for 
electronic signatures obliges Member States to ensure 
that the certification service providers and other 
national authorities responsible for the accreditation 
and supervision of these providers comply with the 
requirements of Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such 
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data. Accordingly, the development of the 
information society and the implementation of 
electronic signatures must be exercised in accordance 
with the data protection requirements. 
The interested third party, the Communications 
Authority, pointed out in its explanations that in 
accordance with article 4(9) of the Law on residents’ 
register, the personal identification number is a 
unique sequence of eleven digits that identifies a 
person, enables the collection of data about a person, 
and ensures the interoperability of the state registers 
and information systems. These provisions lead to the 
conclusion that a personal identification number is 
one of the items of primary personal data enabling 
the identification of a person. Also noted that 
according to article 2(14) of the Law on Electronic 
Signature the certificate is defined as an ‘electronic 
attestation which links signature-verification data to 
the signatory’, and ‘approves or allows the 
identification of the signatory’. According to article 
2(15) of the same law, a qualified certificate is a 
certificate ‘issued by the government’s service 
provider or its authorized authority which complies 
with the certification requirements’. 
Before issuing a qualified certificate, the certification 
service provider takes the following steps in order to 
identify the person: carries out an identity check and 
requests a proof of valid identity documents with the 
personal identification number (paragraph 8, 9 of the 
Schedule on the issue of certificates and consultation 
procedures approved by the Order of the Director of 
Electronic Communications No. 1V-406 of 19 April, 
2011 (‘Schedule’)); collects and stores all the 
information and documents obtained (paragraph 10 
of the Schedule); provides a certificate number in the 
qualified certificate and keeps a record of it (article 
2(15) point 7 of Law on Electronic Signature). It is 
therefore concluded that the signatory’s identity is 
determined according to his/her identity document 
that is provided for receiving a qualified certificate. 
Furthermore, it is noted that the personal 
identification number is not obligatory in the qualified 
certificate according to the Law on Electronic 
Signature. However, the law provides that the 
certification service provider can include other special 
attributes of the signatory if it is necessary for the 
adequate use of the qualified certificate. According to 
the Communications Authority, if this is the question, 
the personal identification number can be regarded as 
a special attribute in a qualified certificate. 
The interested third party the Committee agreed with 
the complaint. 
The Committee pointed out that in some cases, the 
electronic signature has to confirm the data and 
identify the signatory. In fact, the electronic signature 
certificate serves to identify the person. An electronic 
signature must not only identify the signatory, but 
also confirm his/her identity. It is noted that the list of 
documents proving personal identity can be found in 
the Passport Law. Such documents are the passport – 
confirming the Republic of Lithuania citizen’s identity, 
and the identity card – confirming person’s identity 
and citizenship. Both the passport and identity card 
must provide a personal identification number. The 
Lithuanian passport or identity card and a certificate 
in cyberspace can be considered to some extent as 
equivalent documents, because, although they are 
not identical in the terms of the use, they perform the 
same function – identifies the person. The personal 
identification number comprises the basic personal 
data and enables a person to be identified. Otherwise, 
a person’s identity could be determined only by using 
other types of personal data (name, address, 
residence address, date of birth and so on). The 
personal identification number is the main type of 
personal data, which allows for the direct 
identification of the person. According to article 2(15) 
point 4 of the Law on Electronic Signature, specific 
attributes can be written in a qualified certificate if it 
is necessary for its use. Therefore, the Committee 
believes that the law does not prohibit the use of a 
personal identification number in the certificate. It is 
emphasized that often the signatory’s name and 
personal identification number is indicated in paper 
documents (applications, contracts and so on) if other 
personal information is unknown. By signing 
documents in cyberspace with an electronic signature, 
the personal identification number enables a person 
to be automatically and unambiguously ascertained. 
The Committee recognized that the signatory must be 
given an opportunity in some cases (for example, 
signing public documents) not to disclose a personal 
code, in order to protect his/her legitimate interests. 
Until 1 May 2011, the Committee implemented the 
power attributed to it as a supervision authority of 
electronic signatures that included the registration of 
certification service providers. According to paragraph 
9 of the Government’s Resolution No. 2108 of the 31 
December 2002 on the registration procedures of 
certification service providers (‘Registration 
procedure’), the Committee had a duty not to register 
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the certification service provider if the documents 
provided did not meet the established requirements 
or an application and other documents contained 
incomplete or incorrect data. These requirements are 
set up in the abovementioned resolution, which 
includes the requirements for the service provider’s 
internal administration system, service activities, and 
etc. 
The interested third party, the Population Register 
Service under the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior 
(‘Population Service’) asked to resolve the case in 
court’s discretion. 
The Population Service stated that currently a 
personal identification number is recorded in qualified 
certificates of the identity cards. During preparation 
for the practical implementation it was found that 
refusing to provide a personal identification number 
in the certificate would lead to identification problem. 
In practice, it may occur that two people have the 
same names and the same date of birth, therefore 
only different codes then can distinguish persons. 
Signing paper documents, identification number is not 
required, but in practice (e.g., signing insurance, utility 
service, telecommunications service and other 
agreements) it is always asked with identification 
document. Such information is always checked. In 
cyberspace, the contract party needs to make sure 
that the signatory is the one who has the right to sign 
the document. The identification of the signatory is 
also important for e-banking, especially for electronic 
bank transaction. The beneficiary (the bank) of signed 
electronic document must ensure that the signatory is 
really the person who has the right to manage a bank 
account. 
The interested third party, the ‘Digital Certification 
Centre’, requested the court to dismiss the complaint 
as unfounded. 
The ‘Digital Certification Centre’ indicated that Law on 
Legal Protection of Personal Data prohibits the 
publication of a personal identification number, and 
that it is an obligatory provision. Even if article 2(15) 
point 4 of the Law on Electronic Signature provides 
that the special attributes can be used in the 
certificate, if it is necessary for the purposes for which 
the certificate is going to be used, it cannot overrule 
the general provision of the Law on Legal Protection 
of Personal Data. According to the law, it is prohibited 
to make the personal identification number public. 
Any additional personal attributes that are not 
directly provided by the legislator can be added to a 
qualified certificate if the certification service provider 
ensured that such attributes or methods of use 
confirms with the European Union and the Lithuanian 
law; is related with potential hazards or risks to the 
holder of the certificate, and the user of the certificate 
is warned in advance, indicating the specific risks (e.g., 
possible uncontrolled dissemination of personal data); 
the qualified certificate contains the link to the public 
information about the certification service provider 
with a clear and detailed statement of the purposes of 
the use of a qualified certificate (as required by the 
Law on Electronic Signature). It was argued that article 
7(1) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data 
provides that the personal identification number is a 
unique sequence of numbers. The personal code is 
issued in accordance with Law on Residents’ register. 
Among other things, it was pointed out that the State 
Enterprise Centre of Registers is electronic services 
provider. At the same time, it provides commercial 
services which are not provided for by the law. The 
service of issuing qualified certificates is a commercial 
service of this public body. The State Control of the 
Republic of Lithuania expressed its views on the 
controversial commercial certification activities of the 
applicant. Each qualified certification service provider 
must be registered within the Lithuanian electronic 
signature supervisory institution. The ‘Digital 
Certification Centre’ was the first qualified 
certification service provider legally registered in 
2005. During the initial activity of registration, the 
company received a note from the inspectorate about 
the use of the personal identification number in a 
qualified certificate. In order to meet the requirement 
of state authorities, the ‘Digital Certification Centre’ 
removed the personal identification number from the 
certificates. The ‘Digital Certification Centre’ was then 
officially registered as a qualified certification service 
provider. The applicant registered their commercial 
electronic certification activities with the supervisory 
institution in 2008. In accordance with the general 
procedure at the time of the registration, the 
applicant knew the requirement for the use of the 
personal identification number. However, despite the 
fact that the applicant’s services did not fulfil the legal 
requirements, its commercial activities were 
registered that led to two different precedents in the 
registration procedures in Lithuania. Two economic 
entities became operational in the market: ‘Digital 
Certification Centre’, which satisfied the obligatory 
requirements, and State Enterprise Centre of 
Registers, apparently ignoring these requirements. 
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Performing public and commercial services at the 
same time, the applicant de facto inserts into its 
public services qualified certificates that contain a 
personal identification number. So, in a short period 
of time the applicant has acquired a dominant 
position in the market of digital certificates. Holding a 
monopoly right in the field of public electronic 
services and wishing to reinforce the dominant 
position in the market, the applicant started to 
demand qualified certificates with the personal 
identification number. This is the second precedent 
when due to the legal nihilism of the State Enterprise 
Centre of Registers, ‘Digital Certification Centre’ has 
suffered direct damages. The applicant in the current 
procedures attempts to legitimize its questionable 
status quo and avoid responsibility for the illegal issue 
of thousands of qualified certificates with individual 
identification number, as well as prevent 
responsibility of the use of the European Union 
structural funds for the development of public 
electronic services. 
The decision of the court of first instance 
II 
In the contested decision, Vilnius District 
Administrative Court found the appeal admissible and 
well founded. The court of first instance annulled the 
Order of the defendant. 
The court found that a matter of dispute in the case in 
question is the legitimacy and validity of the Order, 
and the object of the dispute – the use of personal 
identification number in a qualified certificate. The 
court followed the provisions of articles 5(1), 22(1) 
and 3(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings. 
The court evaluated the written evidence. It also 
followed article 4(9) of the Law on Residents’ register, 
articles 1(1), 2(1) and 2(4), 3(1) part 4, of the Law on 
Legal Protection of Personal Data, articles 2(4), 2(14), 
2(15) of the Law on Electronic Signature, paragraphs 
8, 9, 10 of the Schedule, and article 1 (1) point 2 of the 
Identity Card Act. Systematic analysis of legal norms 
presupposed the conclusion that a personal 
identification number can be used in the certificate 
for the purpose to authenticate and identify the 
signatory. The signatory’s identity is determined from 
his personal identity documents that must be 
provided before issuing a qualified certificate. 
Although article 2 (15) of the Law on Electronic 
Signature does not require the inclusion of the 
personal code in an electronic certificate, the law 
gives the right to a certification service provider to 
add specific attributes of the signatory if it is 
necessary in the view of the use of the certificate. The 
court considered that the personal identification 
number can be regarded as a specific attribute. 
Moreover, articles 57 and 86 (2) of the Law on 
Administrative Proceedings were followed. The court 
ruled that the proper assessment of the facts and 
application of the law are closely linked. Only the 
establishment of relevant facts, necessary for the 
proper application of the law, and the legitimate and 
justified decision can be made. Taking into account 
the written evidence, relevant legislation, principles of 
justice and reasonableness, the well-established case 
law (case of the Administrative Supreme Court of 
Lithuania No. 575-392/2011 of 29 August 2011), the 
court ruled that legislature does not forbid the 
defendant to use a personal identification number 
with the person’s consent (usually a person signs the 
agreement regarding the use of the personal code). 
The court found that the Order is illegal and 
unjustified. The defendant incorrectly interpreted and 
applied the substantive law and has issued the illegal 
Order that is contrary to the primary legislation. The 
Order therefore has been annulled. 
Grounds of appeal 
III 
In the appeal, the appellant seeks to have set aside 
the contested decision. The appeal is based on the 
following grounds: 
1. The appellant does not contest the legality of 
verifying a person’s identity prior to the issue of a 
qualified certificate nor the use and storage of 
personal data by the certificate provider. However, 
the appellant claims the use of the personal 
identification number in a qualified certificate for 
signing of e-documents and e-mails. 
2. The Identity Card Act does not regulate the 
qualified certificates issued by the State Enterprise 
Centre of Registers. According to article 3.3.1(d) of the 
States Enterprise Center of Registers’ rules of 24 
November 2010, approved by State Enterprise Centre 
of Register Director, qualification authorities shall 
require that the issued certificate will at least indicate 
the following data: name(s) and surname, personal 
code. 
3. Neither the Law on Electronic Signature, nor any 
other law regulating activities of the State Enterprise 
Centre of Registers, clearly and unequivocally require 
the use of the personal identification number in a 
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qualified certificate. Therefore, differently from the 
person’s name and surname, it cannot be considered 
that the use of the personal code in the qualified 
certificates complies with the legal criteria established 
in article 7(3) point 1 of the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data. 
4. A person cannot choose to use or not to use the 
personal identification number in e-documents and e-
mails. If a person refuses to use such data, he/she 
does not receive the requested services from the 
applicant (a qualified digital electronic signature 
certificate is not issued). Therefore it cannot be held 
that the use of the personal code when signing 
electronic documents complies with article 7(2) of the 
Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, where the 
prerequisite for lawful use is consent from the data 
holder. The use of the personal identification number 
in electronic signatures shall be regarded as excessive. 
The State Enterprise Centre of Registers infringed 
article 3(1) point 4 of the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data by using the personal identification 
number as an excessive amount of data in a qualified 
certificate. 
The respondent asks the court to uphold the 
contested decision and dismiss the appellant’s appeal 
as unfounded. The respondent puts forward the 
following grounds in its response: 
1. The law does not prohibit the use of the personal 
identification number for authentication purposes and 
for the identification of person in the qualified 
certificate. Furthermore the personal identification 
number can be treated as a special attribute within 
the meaning of article 2(15) point 4 of the Law on 
Electronic Signature, when it is necessary for the use 
of a qualified certificate. 
2. All certification service providers who are 
empowered to issue the digital identification 
documents must apply legal acts, regulating personal 
identification questions in cyberspace, equally – the 
Law on Electronic Signature and the Law on Legal 
Protection of Personal Data and the Identity Card Act. 
3. It is important to understand and correctly evaluate 
the importance of a qualified certificate and its 
validity. The law distinguishes an electronic signature 
and an advanced electronic signature. When issuing 
an advanced electronic signature, the inclusion of a 
personal code in the qualified certificate is not only 
possible, but necessary. A personal code is the only 
and unique characteristic of a person in the country. 
The requirement not to use the personal identification 
number in the qualified certificate is unfounded. 
4. When a qualified certificate is issued, the person is 
informed that the code is indicated in the documents. 
A qualified certificate is issued only with the written 
person’s consent (when signing an agreement). The 
state body has no right to prohibit a holder of a 
qualified certificate to use his personal identification 
number. Qualified certificates are issued for the use 
and creation of a secure electronic signature. 
The third interested party, the Communications 
Authority, states that it upholds its previous position 
set out in the explanatory notes in the court of first 
instance. It is indicated that the use of a personal 
identification number in a qualified certificate is not 
prohibited to authenticate the data and verify the 
identity of the signatory. It may be regarded as a 
specific attribute within the meaning of article 2(15) 
point 4 of the Law on Electronic Signature, if it is 
necessary for the use of the certificate. 
The third interested party, the Committee, asks the 
court to uphold the contested decision. 
The Committee repeats previously stated arguments, 
indicating that it does not consider that the use of the 
personal code in the electronic signature certificate is 
superfluous. The evaluation of the legality of use shall 
be determined taking into account the purposes for 
which the certificate is used. A personal identification 
number is made public by a signatory of the electronic 
document, and not by the certification service 
provider. A person himself chooses the certification 
services provider and is not forced to choose the 
certification service provider that necessarily uses a 
personal code in the electronic signature certificate. 
However, the signatory must be given an opportunity 
in some cases (for example, when signing public 
documents) not to disclose a personal identification 
number, in order to protect the legitimate interests of 
processing personal data. 
The third interested party, the Population Register 
Service, in the response to the appeal, repeats the 
previously made arguments, and requests the court to 
rely on the provisions of the legislation and principles 
of reasonableness and justice and solve the case in 
court’s discretion. 
The fourth interested party, ‘Digital Certification 
Centre’, asks to set aside the contested decision of 
Vilnius District Administrative Court and issue a new 
decision. It submits the following arguments: 
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1. The systematic analysis of the circumstances of the 
use of the qualified certificate shows that the Law on 
Electronic Signature de facto prohibits the use of a 
personal code in the qualified certificate. The court 
wrongly compared the certificate with an identity 
document. The applicant limits the choice of the 
consumers, violates the law protecting of personal 
data and restricts the possibility of the consumers to 
control the use of their personal identification 
number when the electronic signature document is 
transferred to another parties. 
2. According to article 15(2) of the Law on Electronic 
Signature, a qualified certificate can be supplemented 
with the individual’s attributes (but not identifiers), 
when it is needed for the use of the certificate. 
However, there is no legal ground to add any 
identification details in the certificate. Therefore, the 
contested decision created preconditions for the 
unauthorized use of the personal identification 
number in qualified certificates. 
Findings of the Higher Administrative Court of 
Lithuania 
IV 
The appeal is upheld. 
The essence of this administrative dispute is the 
applicant’s right to include a personal identification 
number in the qualified certificates according to the 
Law on Electronic Signature. From the facts of the 
case it is seen that the appellant bases such a right 
from the definition of ‘qualified certificate’ as it is 
given in article 2(15) of the Law on Electronic 
Signature. According to the mentioned law (article 
2(15) point 4) a qualified certificate, among other 
things, can include ‘the special attributes of the 
signatory, if it is necessary for the purposes for which 
the certificate is going to be used’. According to the 
appellant, the personal identification number can be 
regarded as a special attribute, therefore it can be 
legally included (indicated) in the qualified certificate. 
The appellant bases its position on the provisions of 
the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, where it 
is set that the data controller (in this case, the 
appellant) is responsible for ensuring that the 
personal data is used ‘only as much as it is needed for 
the collection and processing of data’ (article 3(1) p. 
4), and restrictions on the use of personal 
identification number are imposed (article 7(2), p. 4).  
Firstly, taking into account the positions of the parties, 
the interdependence of the abovementioned laws 
must be determined and must be established which of 
them is the special law, having the priority in the case 
under appeal. With regard to the facts of the case, it 
should be noted that the parties do not argue about 
the disclosure of the personal data (the electronic 
signature of the holder and the personal identification 
number) in the qualified certificate to the direct 
addressee (recipient) or other third party, when 
electronic documents or e-mails with digital signature 
are submitted or transmitted to other party. 
Regarding the interaction between the Law on 
Electronic Signature and the Law on Legal Protection 
of Personal Data, it is noted that the objects regulated 
by the Law on Electronic Signature are the electronic 
signature (secure electronic signature), the certificate 
(a qualified certificate) and the link between a 
signatory and the signed data. These objects, by their 
nature, are attributable to personal data, regulated by 
the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data (such 
conclusion can be made from the legal descriptions of 
the terms). Therefore, it must be concluded that the 
Law on the Legal Protection of Personal data is a 
special law and has superiority over the Law on 
Electronic Signature. Furthermore, article 12(1) point 
3 of the Law on Electronic Signature obliges the 
certification service provider (in this case the 
applicant) to ensure the protection of personal data 
when issuing the certificate, as it is provided in the 
Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data and other 
legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania. This means that 
the provisions of the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data, regulating the processing of personal 
data and setting the prohibitions and restrictions for 
such data, directly and without any reservation 
applies in the legal field regulated by the Law on 
Electronic Signature, especially where it concerns the 
management of personal data, the creation and the 
issuance of the qualified certificates and personal 
signatures. Subject to the foregoing arguments, it is 
concluded that article 2(15) point 4 of the Law on 
Electronic Signature can be applied in the present 
situations as far as it does not conflict and is in 
accordance with the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data. 
It is noted that the data controller’s (the applicant can 
be regarded as a data controller according to article 
2(7) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data) 
obligations in processing personal data are set out in 
article 3 of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal 
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Data (relevant edition No.XI-1372 of 5 December 
2011). The article indicates that the data controller 
must ensure that personal data is adequate, relevant 
and does not go beyond what is necessary to collect 
and process such data. The mentioned article provides 
the criteria according to which the scope of personal 
data must be determined, and that it is closely related 
with the collection and the further handling of such 
data. The different criterion must be established in 
each case depending on the assessment of a certain 
situations. The evaluation of each situation allows the 
determination of the minimum scope of the personal 
data that needs to be collected by the controller in 
order to perform its operations and handle the data 
further according to the legislative requirements. In 
other words, if the data controller (the appellant) can 
objectively perform its functions (in this case 
functions set out in the Law on Electronic Signature) 
without the disputed personal identification number, 
such data according to article 3(1) point 4 of the Law 
on Legal Protection of Personal Data shall be deemed 
excessive and such use prohibited. 
It is clear from the facts of this case, that the personal 
identification number (the requirement for a person 
to submit the personal identification number) is 
needed for the applicant before forming the 
certificate (the qualified certificate) to determine 
(check) the identity of the person, i.e. before issuing 
the certificate and processing the data. Otherwise, the 
applicant would not be able to ensure the 
unambiguous identification of the electronic signature 
holder. It should be noted that a use of a personal 
code in such situations is established under paragraph 
8 and 9 of the Schedule, and that the defendant does 
not object such use. However, comparing the use of a 
personal code in a qualified certificate with the ability 
of the applicant to carry out the management 
functions of these certificates, it is noted that the 
absence of a personal identification number in the 
qualified certificate does not preclude the appellant, 
as a certification service provider, to carry out his 
duties. Such conclusion, among other things, is 
confirmed by the third party concerned ‘Digital 
Certification Centre’ that performs the same duties. 
Given the above considerations, it follows that the 
appellant’s use of the personal code in a qualified 
certificate according to article 3(1) point 4 on the Law 
on Legal Protection of Personal Data is illegitimate. 
Taking into account the specific issue of the personal 
identification number and that this number has a 
unique significance in the field of human rights, article 
7 on the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data sets 
out special rules for its use. This means that a special 
condition for the use of the personal identification 
number, as established in the legislation, is applicable 
without exception to all situations. The restrictions 
and prohibitions to use personal code are provided in 
article 7(2) of the abovementioned legislation (version 
No. X-1444 of 2 January 2008). This article states that 
the management of the personal identification 
number can be done only with the data subject’s 
consent, except in situations when the use of personal 
identification number is prohibited (article 7(2) points 
4 and 5). The law prohibits making the personal code 
available to the public. When applying specified 
provisions of article 7 in the present situation, it is 
noted that data subject’s consent to use his personal 
code, as mentioned in second part of the article, 
would imply a situation where the data subject clearly 
and unambiguously understands the use of his/her 
personal data, the necessity to make such use and has 
an interest in such use. (In this context, it should be 
noted that this situation corresponds to the 
abovementioned use of the personal identification 
number when determining the identity of the 
signatory prior the issues of qualified certificate, i.e. 
prior the management of certificate and the personal 
data). On the contrary, in a situation where the data 
subject does not know and cannot know the 
circumstances of the use (disclosure) of the personal 
identification number (the situation when digitally 
signed document is transferred to other persons), the 
condition of article 7(2) of the Law on Legal Protection 
of Personal Data – the consent given from the data 
subject – is not met. 
Article 7(4) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal 
Data imperatively prohibits to publish (make public) 
the personal identification number. This rule shall be 
interpreted by the linguistic method. According to the 
Lithuanian dictionary, one of the meanings of the 
word ‘public’ is open, non-confidential. The meaning 
of the word ‘publish’ – the dissemination of 
knowledge (‘Modern Lithuanian Dictionary’, 
Lithuanian Language Institute, Vilnius, 2000, page 931, 
701). The above-discussed situation when the 
personal identification number is disclosed and 
transferred to an indeterminate number of persons 
together with the digital signature, is understood as 
one of the ways of making ‘publicly available’. This 
allows the court to conclude that article 7(4) of the 
Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data is infringed 
in the present case. 
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Taking into account the findings of the court, it follows 
from all of the above considerations that the 
appellant’s complaint cannot be upheld and must be 
rejected. The Court of First Instance incorrectly 
interpreted and applied the substantive law relevant 
in this case. Therefore, the contested decision is 
annulled (according to article 143 of the Law on 
Administrative Proceedings). 
 
Order 
In accordance with the article 88(1), article 136, article 
140(1) point 2 of the Law on Administrative 
Proceedings, 
The Court hereby: 
Annuls the Vilnius District Administrative Court 
decision of 11 April 2012 and dismisses the 
appellant’s, the State Enterprise Centre of Registers, 
complaint as unfounded. 
The decision is final. 
Judges 
Laimė Baltrūnaitė 
Anatolijus Baranovas 
Irmantas Jarukaitis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With thanks to Jurate Breimelyte for her help with this 
translation.  
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Lithuania has been a member of the European Union 
since 1 May 2004, and diligently follows the EU 
guidance on regulating personal data protection. Data 
protection has been comprehensively regulated in 
Lithuania since 1996 by the special Law on Legal 
Protection of Personal Data (the current legislation in 
force is Law of 23 February 2008 (effective from 1 
January 2009) with subsequent amendments effective 
from 1 September 2011) (Lietuvos Respublikos 
asmens duomenų teisinės apsaugos įstatymas 1996 
m. birželio 11 d. Nr. I-1374). 
The Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data 
implements the EU Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC,1 and also provides specific national rules on 
many additional issues of national importance, such 
as the processing of personal identification numbers. 
Other areas of specific national data protection 
regulation include, but is not limited to regulations on 
data protection in the healthcare and medical fields, 
regulations on public polls, direct marketing, 
management of debtor information, credit bureaus 
and credit referencing and video surveillance. 
Generally, the Lithuanian government officials and 
judges have adopted strict approach to the 
interpretation of the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data. Normally, the data subject is given the 
benefit of the doubt and the legal regime tends to be 
restrictive of personal data processing. The definition 
of personal data in the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data is based on the standard definition of 
personal data found in the EU Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC. It applies to any data pertaining to 
an identifiable individual. Case law and administrative 
practice interprets the definition increasingly broadly. 
Information is treated as personal data if publicly 
available material can be used to indirectly identify 
the relevant individual. In particular, IP addresses, car 
                                                          
1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
OJ L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050. 
license plates and postal addresses (excluding the 
name) have been recognized as personal data.2 
On the other hand, infringements of the data 
protection regime are subject to insignificant financial 
sanctions (up to 600 euro), and overall the 
enforcement (especially against public data 
controllers) leaves a lot of room for improvement. The 
State Data Protection Inspectorate is the authorized 
data protection authority and supervisor of the Law 
on Legal Protection of Personal Data. In its activities it 
most often relies on issuing administrative orders 
demanding discontinuation of infringing data 
processing, but is short on strong enforcement 
powers. 
Personal identification numbers in Lithuania were 
introduced in the early 1990s. The personal 
identification number is composed of 11 digits, is 
uniquely attributed to each individual and is printed in 
his passport and personal identity card. 
Unfortunately, at the time when personal 
identification numbers were introduced in Lithuania, 
the privacy considerations were not ascertained and 
the data protection regulations were not in place. 
Because of this, the structure that was chosen for the 
personal identification number in Lithuania was not 
random. Instead, it directly provides information 
about the sex (1 number out of 11) and the date of 
birth (6 numbers out of 11) of the individual. Only the 
last 4 digits in the Lithuanian personal identification 
number are random and independent from the other 
information about the individual. Thus, the Lithuanian 
personal identification numbers by themselves are 
carriers of extended private information, which 
generally are additional to the personal identification 
number. 
This design flaw was recognized by the mid 1990s 
when the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data 
was introduced, but by that time the practical and 
cost considerations prevented the change of the 
                                                          
2 See for example 26 July 2012 ruling of the Higher Administrative 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania in case No. A858-2133/2012 on 
car license plates and the broad interpretation of ‘personal data’. 
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system – all of Lithuania’s population was issued with 
a personal identification number and public 
information registers were designed around them. 
In an attempt to rectify the privacy flaws of the 
personal identification number, the special legal rules 
for the processing of personal identification numbers 
were included into the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data. Article 7 of the Law on Legal Protection 
of Personal Data sets forth an augmented legal 
protection regime for the personal identification 
numbers. Principal rules are akin to the rules 
applicable to sensitive personal data and are 
described below. 
The use of the personal identification number is 
permitted when processing personal data only with 
the consent of the data subject. According to 
paragraph 3 of article 7 of the Law on Legal Protection 
of Personal Data, personal identification numbers may 
be used without the consent of the data subject only 
if:  
(i) such a right is laid down in the law; or 
(ii) it is processed in state or institutional registers 
and information systems, provided that they have 
been officially set up according to the law; or 
(iii) it is processed by legal persons involved in 
activities relating to the granting of loans and 
recovery of debts, insurance or financial leasing, 
health care and social insurance as well as in the 
activities of other institutions providing and 
administrating social care, educational 
establishments, science and studies institutions; 
or 
(iv) it is processed for the purpose of classified 
data in cases laid down by legislation. 
Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 7 of the Law 
on Legal Protection of Personal Data, the personal 
identification number may not be made public, and 
personal identification numbers may not be collected 
and processed for direct marketing purposes. Legal 
persons, who process personal identification numbers 
for legitimate purposes, may use the personal 
identification number only for the purpose for which 
it has been received and only in cases where it is 
necessary for a legitimate and specified purpose of 
personal data processing. 
Due to the strict personal identification number 
processing criteria, it became a routine inquiry for the 
State Data Protection Inspectorate of the Republic of 
Lithuania to check and evaluate processing of 
personal identification numbers. 
Background of the case  
Against the background noted above, the State 
Enterprise Centre of Registers (the plaintiff in 
administrative case No. A-143-2740-12), who is the 
data controller for the principal state or institutional 
registers and information systems in the Republic of 
Lithuania, interpreted the personal identification 
number processing rules as allowing them to process 
the personal identification number for the purposes 
of qualified electronic signatures. To be precise, the 
personal identification number was technologically 
incorporated into the public qualified electronic 
signature certificates (as part of the data comprising 
the qualified certificate) issued by the State Enterprise 
Centre of Registers. 
The State Enterprise Centre of Registers justified such 
use of the personal identification number by the 
official status and public powers granted to the State 
Enterprise Centre of Registers in legislation, as well as 
by the rules on the qualified electronic signature 
certificates provided for in the Law on Electronic 
Signature (Lietuvos Respublikos elektroninio parašo 
įstatymas 2000 m. liepos 11 d. Nr. VII-1822). 
According to such rules, the qualified certificate ‘may 
include special attributes of the signatory, if this is 
necessary for the purposes for which the certificate is 
going to be used’. 
The State Data Protection Inspectorate (the defendant 
in administrative case No. A-143-2740-12) held that 
the use of the personal identification numbers in the 
public qualified electronic signature certificates was 
not justifiable under the special rules of the Law on 
Legal Protection of Personal Data, as well as being 
excessive under the general principle of using only a 
minimum of personal data required for the purpose. 
Therefore, the State Data Protection Inspectorate 
issued an administrative order to the State Enterprise 
Centre of Registers, demanding a discontinuation of 
the use of the personal identification numbers in 
public qualified electronic signature certificates issued 
by the State Enterprise Centre of Registers. 
The State Enterprise Centre of Registers refused to 
comply and challenged the administrative order in the 
court. The plaintiff was successful in the 
administrative court of first instance (the Vilnius 
District Administrative Court) in that the order was 
annulled. The State Data Protection Inspectorate 
 
Data protection law and personal identification numbers in Lithuania                                               vvvvvvvv   
 
 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 11 (2014) | 164 
 
appealed this decision, and brought the case to the 
final instance of administrative justice (the Higher 
Administrative Court of the Republic of Lithuania). 
Arguments of the court  
The court emphasized that the legal interpretation 
relies on the factual acknowledgment that the use of 
the personal identification number in the qualified 
electronic signature certificate discloses the personal 
identification number to the recipient (addressee) of 
the electronic documents signed with the public 
certificate. Furthermore, where the signed electronic 
documents are further distributed by the recipient, 
this also causes further publicity of the personal 
identification number. 
The court held that the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data is a special law with respect to the Law 
on Electronic Signatures, hence the rules of the 
former supersede any rules of the latter. Specifically, 
the Law on Electronic Signatures does not provide any 
exceptions from the special rules of personal 
identification number processing, according to the 
Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data. 
The court also suggested a test for verifying whether 
the personal data processing meets the general 
principle of using only a minimum of personal data 
required for the purpose – if the same purpose of 
data processing can be achieved without using a 
disputed data item, then the processing of such a data 
item shall be deemed excessive. Thus, in a specific 
situation, while the processing of personal data is 
justifiable for the State Enterprise Centre of Registers 
own purposes of identifying the signatory, it is not 
justifiable to incorporate the personal identification 
number into the public qualified electronic signature 
certificate, which is distributed to other parties. In 
order for the latter use of the personal identification 
number to be acceptable, the consent of the data 
subject is mandatory, according to the article 7 of the 
Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data. 
Moreover, article 7 of the Law on Legal Protection of 
Personal Data imperatively prohibits making the 
personal identification number public. The factual 
aspect of inadvertent dissemination of the personal 
identification number through the communicating of 
the signed electronic documents (with the public 
qualified certificate attached) constituted an 
infringement of this imperative. 
On the basis of the above, the Higher Administrative 
Court of the Republic of Lithuanian reversed the 
decision of the first instance and upheld the 
administrative order of the State Data Protection 
Inspectorate. 
Implications  
The case and the arguments of the court have revived 
the discussion on the privacy issues relating to 
personal identifications numbers in Lithuania. 
Currently plans are being laid down to phase out the 
existing personal identification number nomenclature 
and to replace it with the random string of 11 digits. 
Nevertheless, the privacy friendly decision of the 
court may prove to be Pyrrhic victory, since the State 
Enterprise Centre of Registers has not abandoned the 
practice of incorporating the personal identification 
number into the public qualified certificated as of yet. 
Moreover, in the latest development as of September 
2014, it is likely that the decision of the court will be 
at least partially overruled by the new legislation, 
mandating the inclusion of personal identification 
numbers into the public qualified electronic signature 
certificates, which are submitted to the Register of 
Legal Entities (which is also run by the State Enterprise 
Centre of Registers). 
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